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Abstract: This paper examines the reform outcome of the Uruguay Round relating to trade in 
agriculture, the nature of the unfinished reform agenda and policy choices for the Doha Round, with 
special emphasis on the position of developing in trade negotiations. A key policy inference is that, to 
be effective, agricultural trade liberalisation should involve simultaneous reforms of the trade regime 
and domestic production support mechanisms.  Concerted international initiatives to provide financial 
and institutional support for economic adjustment and social safety programs can play an important 
role in making such comprehensive reforms politically palatable and feasible. While overloading the 
WTO with matters that fall beyond its purview may be counterproductive, there is certainly a case for 
a coordinated effort involving the WTO and international development finance institutions.  
Developing countries should eschew excessive reliance on ‘special and differential treatments’ and 
instead strive to make use of multilateral liberalisation commitments to lock in much-needed 
structural reforms in domestic agriculture.  
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Agricultural Trade Reforms in the Doha Round: 




The implementation of the built-in reform agenda of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA) is a major challenge for the Doha Round of trade negotiation launched 
in November 2001.  Given emphasis placed by developing-country members of the WTO on 
agricultural trade liberalisation as the single most important global trade policy issue, 
progress on agricultural negotiations is central to the successful completion of the Doha 
Round as a whole.  Agricultural negotiations in the Round started with some high hopes, but 
a range of disagreements soon began to hamper the negotiations, resulting in a failure to meet 
the April 2003 deadline for deciding the ‘modalities’ (a work program) for further 
negotiation. Completing this overdue task was a priority item on the agenda of the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun in September 2003.  However, Cancun trade negotiations 
collapsed in acrimony because of irreconcilable differences between the EU and the USA 
(who presented a joint proposal for limited cuts in agricultural subsidies), and the developing 
countries led by the ‘Group of 20’ (G-20)1 (who emphasised ‘special and differential 
treatments’ while eschewing commitment to reciprocal liberalisation).   
 
The Doha Round negotiations remain in suspension since the Cancun debacle. 
However, chances for resuming trade talks in the near future seem high, although concluding 
the round by the original deadline of 31 December 2004 is a virtual impossibility.  In the joint 
ministerial declaration issued at the conclusion of the APEC summit in Bangkok in the last 
week October 2003, the US and other Pacific Rim countries expressed willingness to re-
launch the Doha Round on the basis of the chairman’s text of the Cancun Ministerial Meeting 
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1 A coalition of developing countries (originally comprising 22 members) formed in the  lead-up to the Cancun 
summit to form a common front against the US-EU position on farm subsidies.  At the time of writing (May 
2004) it comprised 17 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, India, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines,  South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. 
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(‘Derbez text’). This also seems to be the position of the non-APEC member countries of the 
G20.  At the annual OECD Ministerial Meeting held in mid-May 2004, the Ministers 
(informally) agreed upon a timetable for finalising a framework agreement by the end of July, 
with the aim of meeting the 1 January 2005 deadline for completing negotiations (in all areas, 
not jut agriculture) (Cahill 2004). The EU have opted to remain in a ‘reflective mode’ until 
all other parties make a firm commitment, but would welcome an early resumption of trade 
talks (Lamy, 2003, p 6).  The recent WTO interim ruling (of 26 April 2004) on the ‘cotton 
case’ (Economist, 2004)2, coupled with the expiry of the ‘peace clause’ on agricultural 
subsidies3 in the URAA at the end of 2003 are likely to exert pressure on the USA and EU to 
negotiate seriously on agricultural trade.  
 
In this context, this paper aims to broaden our understanding of the process of 
agricultural trade liberalisation initiated in the Uruguay round, achievements to date, and 
issues involved in the implantation of the Doha Development Round (DDR) reform agenda, 
with a focus on developing countries. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 
provides a stage-setting discussion on the role of agriculture in the national economy and 
agricultural trade patterns in developing countries. Section 3 describes Uruguay Round 
reform commitments, followed by an assessment of the reform outcome in Section 4. Section 
5 examines policy options for the Doha Round.  The key inferences are summarised in the 
final section. 
 
2. Agriculture in Developing Countries 
The economies of the developing countries have changed significantly over the past half a 
century, reflecting a significant overall decline in the relative importance of the agricultural 
sector.  However, agriculture still accounts for a quarter of GDP in low-income countries. 
Over three-fourths of the population find livelihood in rural areas, mostly dependent on 
agriculture (Table 1).    
 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
                                                          
2  The case filed by Brazil against subsidies provided by the US government to domestic cotton farmers.  These 
subsidies were a major pint of contention which partly contributed to the collapse of agricultural talks in Cancun 
(Economists, 2003). 
3  Article 13 of the URAA, also known as the ‘peace clause’, restrains Members from challenging certain 
agricultural subsidies during the nine-year implementation period  
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Patterns of world trade in agricultural products largely mirror changes on the output 
side. The share of agricultural products in total merchandise exports from all country groups 
has declined significantly over the years (Table 2).  The decline measured in terms of gross 
export earnings, however, overstates the diminishing importance of agricultural imports as 
most of the manufactured exports from these countries (low income countries in particular) 
are based on simple domestic processing of imported inputs (garments, in particular).  In 
terms of net foreign exchange earnings, agriculture is much more important than is indicated 
by gross export earnings.   
 
Commodity composition of agricultural exports from developing countries has been 
evolving, with significant implications for their interests in international trade negotiations. In 
particular, there are two important developments. First, the share of agricultural raw materials 
(the so-called tropical products) in total agricultural exports has declined precipitously, 
accompanied by a rapid increase in the share of food products (temperate-zone products). 
Tariffs on agricultural raw materials have been historically low in developed countries (as 
they are inputs to domestic industries) and the on-going debate on market access for 
developing country exports relates mostly to tariffs on food products.   
 
Second, within total food exports, the share of processed food has increased 
dramatically over the past decade (Table 2, Panel b; and Table 3).  Powerful forces on both 
demand and supply sides have underpinned this far-reaching change in world agricultural 
trade (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2003). On the demand side, `internationalisation of food 
habits’ - the increased importance of imported processed items in consumption patterns in 
developed countries as well as in large sections of the populace in many developing countries 
- appears to play a key role.  Factors such as international migration, the communications 
revolution and international tourism have contributed to this phenomenon. This significant 
demand-side impetus seems to have been supported by important supply-side developments 
such as improvements in food technology, refrigeration facilities and transportation that have 
made processed food items easily tradable across national boundaries. 
 
Table 3 about here 
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The new export opportunities in processed food deserve special attention in the policy 
debate on global integration of agricultural resource-rich countries for a number of reasons. 
First, there is evidence that the degree of income and price elasticity of demand for processed 
food is very high. This implies that export diversification into this commodity category will 
bring in significant gains in the terms of trade.  Second, unlike in the case of further 
processing of resources such as minerals and timber, final stages of food processing appear to 
be labor-intensive. Third, in terms of potential net balance of payments implications, 
processed food would be even superior to ‘conventional’ manufactured goods because of 
lower import intensity. Finally, the expansion of these exports is a powerful vehicle for 
linking the rural economy in a positive way with the on-going process of economic 
globalization Athukorala and Sen 1998). 
 
However, exploiting new export opportunities in processed food poses many 
challenges. In particular, the capacity of developed country exporters to penetrate these 
markets depends critically on their ability to meet increasingly more stringent food safety 
standards imposed in developed countries. Not only are these standards typically much higher 
than those prevailing in developing countries, and often difficult and costly to meet, but they 
are also subject to frequent changes. Food safety is a ‘luxury’ good whose demand rises as 
income levels rise, and greater prosperity tends to be accompanied by increased demand for 
more stringent SPS standards in developed countries. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, as traditional trade barriers such as tariff and quantitative restrictions continue to 
decline, protectionist interests are likely to make increasing use of food safety regulations and 
other technical barriers to block trade. Meeting international safety standards is far more 
complicated and costly in the case of processed food than in primary agricultural products. 
Thus these standards can retard exports by developing country producers even when they are 
imposed on genuine health and safety considerations because of the limited availability of 
compliance resources.  
 
Export growth rates reported in Panel C of Table 2 coveys an important message 
relating to the relative importance of domestic supply versus external demand factors (access 
to world markets) in determining export success.  In all product categories, low and lower 
middle income countries have generally recorded lower growth rates compared to middle-
income and high-income countries. These patterns suggest that overemphasising the external 
demand factors can lead to wrong policy inferences.  Of course, multilateral trade 
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negotiations offer the possibility of improved growth through trade in products where they 
have a comparative advantage if trading conditions were less distorted.  But, liberalisation 
alone is unlikely to deliver the expected outcome.   
 
Finally, the geographic profile of agricultural exports from developing countries has 
changed dramatically over the years (Table 4).  Nearly 40% of exports are now to other 
developing countries, compared to less than 20% twenty years ago.  At the same time the 
share of developed country exports to developing countries also have grown.  These figures 
suggest that multilateral approach to trade liberalisation is to the mutual benefits of both 
groups of countries.   
 
Table 4 about here 
 
3. Uruguay Round Commitments 
Under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the instrument that governed the 
international trading system during the first half century of the post-war era, the sole focus of 
multilateral trade liberalisation was on trade in industrial products. While multilateral trade 
negotiations in the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo rounds resulted in significant changes in the 
restraints to trade in industrial products, the degree of intervention in the trade in agricultural 
products in fact increased persistently from the late 1950s (Johnson 1991).  The signing of 
the Uruguay Round Accord in 1994 set the stage for ending this long-standing anomaly in the 
international trading system. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPSA), together with the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM) of the newly formed World Trade Organization (WTO) laid a firm 
foundation for ending the long-standing disarray in world agriculture.  
 
(a) Agreement on Agriculture 
The URAA contains rules and commitments in three key areas: export subsidies, domestic 
support and market access. The agreement requires developed countries to reduce the share of 
exports receiving subsidies by 21 percent and the expenditures on subsidies by 36 percent 
from the base-period (1988-89) levels over a 6-year period.4 The required reductions in 
                                                          
4 In the URAA, export subsidies are defined to include all payments from the national budget that are 
contingent on export performance. Export credit and export guarantees are not included in the definition. 
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subsidy levels and subsidy coverage for developing countries from 21 percent and 14 percent 
respectively, and these reductions are to be undertaken over a 10-year period.  The least-
developed countries have no obligation to reduce export subsidies, but they are required to 
freeze them at the base level. 
 
Domestic support commitments in URAA aim to reduce trade-distorting domestic 
supports and keep them within certain limits, and induce a further shift towards measures that 
are not, or only minimally, distortive of production and trade.  The agreement attempts to 
make a distinction between what constitutes a trade-distorting support of agriculture from the 
more general support of agriculture and rural development (the ‘green box’ measures).  Two 
criteria are used in identifying non-trade distorting (Green Box) support: it must be paid out 
of the government budget and not levied from consumers; and it must not have the effects of 
providing a price support for the producer.  Consequently, the Green Box lists activities such 
as agricultural research, extension services, pest and disease control and so on as items that 
do not count as domestic support.  Capital expenditures on irrigation and other production 
and market infrastructure are also included in Green Box, but not recurrent expenditures or 
preferential user charges on irrigation facilities. Under the ‘peace clause’ on agricultural 
subsidies in the URAA, member countries committed not to submit complaints to the WTO 
on farm support, provided that the subsidies involved did not exceed their 1992 levels.  
Developing countries are permitted to continue with the latter production support measures or 
any kind of trade distorting subsidies, provided the beneficiaries are ‘low income or resource-
poor producers’. 
 
Under the market-access provisions, all WTO members are required to convert all 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) affecting agricultural imports into bound tariffs that in the base 
period (1986-88) provide the same level of protection.  Tariffs resulting from this 
‘tariffication’ process are to be reduced over a period of 6 years by and average of 24% by 
developed countries and over a period of 10 years by an average of 36% by developing 
countries. For those countries whose tariffs were not previously bound under the GATT, 
there is no limit on the level of these bindings and no obligation to reduce them during the 
10-year phase-in period. The least-developed countries are required only to bind their tariffs; 
they are exempted from tariff reduction and NTB removal requirements.  All developing 
countries are exempt from the commitment to liberalize trade in any agricultural products 
which is a predominant staple in their traditional diet.  
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The URAA tariffication process contains two major loop-holes that enable countries 
to maintain actual protection at higher levels compared to what it implied by applied 
(officially declared) tariffs. First, the definition of NTB adopted in the UR Agreement does 
not cover state trading.   The right of WTO members to retain state trading monopolies in 
export and import trade is recognized in Article XVII of the agreement.   The only related 
provisions are that members should ensure that such enterprises act in line with general 
commercial principles in a non-discriminatory manner and provide information on their 
trading mark-ups to trading partners on request. Thus there is room for a member country to 
subvert the market access commitment by authorizing a state trading enterprise to be the sole 
importer for goods previously controlled by NTBs.  
 
Second, URAA permitted member countries to use of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) as a 
means of controlling agricultural trade.  TQRs are a special mode of import duty under which 
a certain volume of imports of a given commodity (the quota) is permitted at a lower tariff, 
and imports beyond the quota subject to a much higher tariff.  In recognition of the possibility 
that many agricultural producing member countries were likely to set tariffs for some 
products at prohibitive levels under the tariffication provisions of the AOA, negotiators at the 
Uruguay Rounds accepted TRQs as a vehicle for imposing minimum market access 
commitments on agricultural imports.  TRQs are obviously less trade distortionary compared 
to prohibitive tariffs (or general import quotas).  But, the market access rules under TQRs 
generally introduce scope for discriminating in the allocation of TRQs between source 
countries and domestic importers.  In particular, the administration of such quotas tends to 
legitimise a role for state-owned trading agencies.  When such agencies have selling rights on 
the domestic market in addition to a monopoly on imports of the given products, they can 
charge excessive mark-ups and thereby distort domestic prices. For these reasons, trade 
analysts generally consider TRQs a  cover element of quantitative management of import 
trade. 
 
(b) SPS Agreement 
The purpose of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement is to strengthen multilateral 
discipline in the implementation of food-safety standards (SPS standards) in agricultural 
trade, with a view to achieving the objective of protecting consumers while regulating the use 
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of these standards as a means of non-border trade protection.  In order to harmonize sanitary 
and phytosanitory measures on as wide a basis as possible, the Agreement encourages 
members to base their measures on international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
where they exist, most notably the Codex Alimentarius, the International Office of Epizootics 
(OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). The Agreement, however, 
affirms the rights of Members to adopt their own SPS measures (Article 2), subject to the 
requirement that a measure is applied ‘only to the extent necessary’ to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health and is based on scientific principles and evidence.   
 
Members are however allowed to adopt SPS measures ‘on the basis of available 
pertinent information’ when ‘relevant scientific evidence is insufficient’, pending a more 
objective evaluation based on fuller evidence within a reasonable time (Article 5.7).  
Moreover, it is expected that Members would accept SPS measures of others as equivalent if 
the exporting country demonstrates to the importing country that its measures achieve the 
importing country’s desired level of health protection. The Agreement recognises that SPS 
risks do not correspond to national boundaries, and that there may be areas within a particular 
country that has lower risks than others, determined by factors such as geography, 
ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the effectiveness of SPS controls, including 
pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence. 
 
In order to achieve transparency in SPS standards, Members are required to publish 
and notify the SPS Secretariat of all proposed and implemented SPS measures. This 
information is relayed via the ‘Notification Authority’ within each Member government. 
Moreover, Members are required to establish an ‘Enquiry Point’, which is the direct point of 





4. Uruguay Round Achievements 
(a) Market Opening 
Under the tariffication commitments of the URAA the WTO member countries have 
abolished most non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on agricultural imports and declared upper bounds 
for tariff rates.  Consequently, tariffs are now the principal means by which countries protect 
their domestic agriculture (and industry).  This is certainly a revolutionary change in the 
world trading system. 
 
However, the actual trade flow effect of the transition from NTBs to tariff is not very 
substantial for the following reasons.  First, benefiting from the rather liberal norms for 
tariffication in URAA, most developing countries have opted for setting high bound tariffs. 
The fixing of high bound rates by these countries appears to have been motivated by the 
desire to leave plenty of space for themselves for future maneuvering and bargaining in the 
tariff negotiation process.  The intended purpose of tariff binding was to set a ‘benchmark 
against which future liberalisation can be undertaken’. However, the bindings eventually 
agreed upon have turned out to be still extremely high, even higher than the actual levels of 
protection existed at the time of signing the agreement.  Second, in most cases the removal of 
NTBs was combined with, or followed by, increasing applied tariff rates, generally closer to 
the high bound rates.  Third, government mandated import monopolies or State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs) still control significant share of imports (mostly essential food items) in a 
considerable number of developing countries.5  Fourth, many countries (including the EU 
and the USA) use tariff quotas (TRQs) to protect domestic producers. Under TRQs, small 
quantities of imports of these products are permitted under moderate tariffs, while applying 
high tariffs.  The market access rules under TQRs generally introduce scope for 
discriminating in the allocation of TRQs between source countries and domestic importers.  
In particular, the administration of such quotas tends to legitimize a role for state-owned 
trading agencies. 
 
The latest available data on applied tariff, bound tariffs, and NTB coverage are 
summarised in Table 5. A number of interesting points emerge from the data.  First, for both 
                                                          
5 The agricultural products which remain under trading monopoly of  state-owned trading enterprises account 
for about 40.5% of agricultural GDP in India 
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agricultural and manufactured goods, the average level of applied tariff in developing 
countries is more than three times higher compared developed countries.  Second, a 
comparison of tariff rates across the developing countries grouped by income level points to a 
clear negative relationship between the stage of development and the level of tariff 
protection.  Tariff rates on both agricultural and manufactured goods are much higher, for 
example, in low-income countries compared to their high-income counterparts. Third, bound 
tariffs on both manufactured goods and agricultural products are extremely high in 
developing countries, particularly in low-income countries.  It is important to note that the 
average rates hide exorbitantly high rates (in the range of 100-300%) in some developing 
countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Athukorala 2001). Third, despite URAA 
tariffication, NTBs still seem to exert considerable influence on agricultural trade, both in 
developed and developing countries.  Interestingly, NTB coverage of agricultural imports is 
considerably higher in developed countries.  This reflects the widespread tendency for some 
developed countries (in particular the EU, the USA and Japan) to use TRQs to protect 
domestic agricultural producers.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
(b) Export Subsidies and Domestic Supports 
In the areas of export subsidy and domestic support reforms, what was achieved in the 
Uruguay Round amounted to little more than a standstill. Developed countries currently 
spend over $300 billions a year supporting their farmers, which amount to 1.3% of the 
combined GDP of OECD member countries or more than six times the amount these 
countries spent on foreign aid.  As a result of these subsidies,  prices received by OECD 
farmers are on average 31% above world prices measured at the border  (Ingco and Nash 
2004).   
 
Developing countries naturally cannot afford to subsidise their farmers, and thus 
across-the-board direct export subsidies, which are WTO inconsistent, are not widely used in 
these countries.  However, a large variety of indirect export subsidies, transport and 
marketing subsidies, are used.  For instance, in India total subsidies on fertilizer, irrigation, 
electricity and agricultural credit amounts to 2.7% of total GDP or 11% of agricultural GDP.  
Pakistan has a long-standing system of subsidies on farm inputs- fertilizer, seeds, tube-wells, 
canal water, electricity and fuel, pesticides, and farm credit. These subsidies amounted to 
 11
over 3% of the value of agricultural output by the mid-1990s (Athukorala 2001).   These 
subsidies are generally WTO consistent, but they form an integral part of the distortionary 
economic environment which thwart long-term growth prospects of the agricultural sector in 
these countries.  
 
(c ) The WTO  Mechanism for Addressing  SPS Issues 
The achievements of the WTO mechanism in enforcing effective discipline over the use of 
SPS measures have certainly lagged behind original expectations (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 
2003).  Several problems have emerged during the implementation of the Agreement. The 
Agreement allows too much latitude to importing countries in adopting SPS measures, 
allowing them to impose measures that impede imports, no matter how unlikely or how 
inconsequential the risk involved. Further, many of the provisions in the SPS Agreement pose 
problems in their interpretation and application. For instance, the requirement that Members 
may adopt more stringent measures if they can base them on ‘sound science’ is a vague 
provision which assumes that there exist a single objective and a correct view of any 
scientific issue. These problems have raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the whole 
dispute settlement mechanism in solving SPS-related trade disputes. It is believed that this 
uncertainty has prevented many countries from further pursuing SPS issues beyond the point 
of discussion at the SPS committee stage.    
 
The developing countries have so far failed to participate in the implementation of the 
SPS Agreement as equal partners (Finger and Schuler 2002, Michalopoulos 2001).  As of end 
December 2002, less than 60% of the total developing country membership (113 countries) of 
the WTO has formally complied with the SPS Agreement.6  Altogether 154 specific trade 
concerns were raised during the eight years from 1995 to the end of 2002 at the meeting of 
the WTO Committee on SPS Measures. Compared to 110 concerns raised by OECD-country 
members, developing-country and least-developed-country members raised only 77 and 2 
concerns respectively. The participation of the latter countries in the SPS dispute settlement 
process has been even poorer. Up to the end of 2002, there were nineteen disputes brought to 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) concerning alleged violation of the SPS 
Agreement.  Developing country members invoked dispute settlement only in three of these 
cases (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2003). 
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Poor participation of developing countries in the implementation of the SPS 
Agreement is due to several reasons.  To benefit from the trade rules of the SPS Agreement, 
developing countries have to set up an appropriate set of institutions, including establishment 
of ‘enquiry points’ to gain enhanced access to developed country markets.  This is 
excessively costly for many developing countries.  World Bank project experience over the 
past five years in helping a number of developing countries to build their capabilities in this 
area suggests that the financial resources needed to implement the WTO rules would amount 
to ‘an entire year’s development budget’ for most of the developing and transitory 
economies’ (Finger and Schuler, 2000, p. 511). The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) 
of the WTO is widely regarded as one of the positive outcomes of the Uruguay Rounds, 
making a move towards a more ‘automatic’ and ‘rule-oriented’ system.  However, the 
experience with the dispute settlement process over the past five years makes it clear that 
developing countries do not enjoy a ‘neutral’ playing field, and that they are unable to 
participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement process. Even a developing country 
makes the large initial institutional investments needed to comply with the Agreement, it 
usually lacks the technical, scientific and legal resources needed to mount or defend a case in 
the dispute process. For example, most developing countries do not have the specialist 
knowledge in international law required to benefit from the DSM, and employing 
international lawyers is an extremely costly proposition.  
 
Further, though the SPS Agreement itself tries to facilitate effective participation of 
the developing countries in it implementation by encouraging developed-country members to 
provide technical assistance and accord special and differential treatment to developing 
countries ( Articles 9 and 8)  developed countries have failed so far to take any serious  steps  
to assist developing countries in this way. International organisations, such as the UNCTAD, 
the ITC and the World Bank have to begin to provide this kind of technical assistance. But, 
these initiatives are still in their early stages and the technical and financial support provided 
so far falls below what is required. In addition, a major problem is the paucity of much 
relevant information. There are also concerns about the length of time given between the 
notification of new SPS measures and their application, and about delays and perceived 
developed-country bias involved in the standards setting mechanism under the Codex. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 29 of the 113 developing country members had not reported to the WTO the information on national 
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There is indeed evidence that the incidence of non-tariff impediments to international 
trade in agricultural products (processed food in particular) stemming from SPS regulations 
has begun to increase in recent year.  Most of the SPS-related trade disputes handled by the 
DSM of the WTO have involved developed countries, but this mostly reflects the lack of 
institutional/financial strength for developing countries to enter into costly legal battle.  There 
are many known episodes of trade disruption cased by SPS concerns of importing countries, 
involving significant export losses for developing countries.   Moreover, there is case study 
based evidence that suggest that may potential exporters shun entering into export markets 
because of the potential threat of SPS–based trade restrictions.   
As tariff barriers and other conventional forms of NTBs are progressively dismantled 
as part of the on-going multilateral and unilateral trade liberalisation initiatives, the 
temptation to use SPS standards (and other non-border measures) as protectionist barriers 
becomes greater. Given that SPS standards are less transparent than tariff or quotas, there is 
ample room for tweaking them to make them stronger than necessary for achieving optimal 
levels of social protection and to twist the related testing and certification (conformity 
assessment) procedures to make competing imports less competitive.7  Even when 
comparable SPS measures are applied in developed countries to both domestic and imported 
products, they can act to impede imports from developing countries because of asymmetry in 
compliance cost. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
notification authorities and  22 developing country members had not yet established SPS enquiry points. 
7 For example a 1998 EC regulation that raised the maximum permissible level of a certain type of aflatoxin (a 
toxic substance) in foodstuffs and animal feed to a higher level than international standards specified by the 
Codex Alimentarius.  The new EU standards, which would reduce health risk by approximately 1.4 death per 
billion a year, would reduce exports worth $670 billion from the 9 African countries, as compared with 
regulation based on the international (Codex) standard.  Another EU regulation requires that diary products be 
manufactured from milk produced by cows kept on farms and milked mechanically. The EU recently invoked 
this regulation to ban import of camel cheese from Mauritania, bringing hardship to a small enterprise. An 
Australian quarantine regulation requires that chicken meat imported from Thailand must be heated at 70 
Celsius for 143 minutes to avoid the possibility of carrying a certain disease. This has effectively closed the 
Australian market for Thai chicken exporter (It is said that the required heat treatment transforms chicken into 
paper!) (See Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2003 and the work cited therein). 
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5. Policy Options for the Doha Round  
 
What should be the appropriate policy choices for developing countries for their effective 
participation in multilateral trade negotiations in the Doha Round (and beyond)?    Can they 
make the best use of multilateral reform commitments to assist long overdue reforms to 
revitalize domestic agriculture as part of the overall national development strategy? What are 
the policy options available to developed countries and international development agencies in 
order to assist effective participation of developing countries in the reform process?  
 
(a) Reducing Border Restrictions 
The first reform priority should be to built on the promising start made in the Uruguay Round 
to reform border protection. Perhaps the most important issue requiring immediate attention 
in this sphere is revision of bound tariffs.  The prevailing high rates cannot serve as useful 
benchmarks for further tariff reduction. In addition, high tariff bounds can be 
counterproductive for the following reasons. 
 
A major gain expected from a transition from NTBs to tariff is a reduction in the 
volatility of world market prices. However, high bound rates naturally leave ample room for 
significant fluctuations below the bound level.  A country with very high bound tariffs can set 
the operative tariff below the upper bound and vary it so as to influence domestic market 
prices.  Prolonged retention of high bound tariffs can harm the ongoing process of unilateral 
liberalisation process by strengthening the protectionist lobby.  High bound tariffs can 
become a potential target for the protectionist lobby in the clamor for high protection.  A 
formal international commitment in the form of relatively low bound tariffs is a great help in 
taming the protectionist lobby.  Cutting bound tariffs will also enhance the ability of 
developing countries to participate systematically in the debate on the world trading system.  
 
Lowering bound rates needs to be accompanied by a program for planned reduction of 
applied tariffs to the levels of industrial tariffs. There is a strong case for widening the 
coverage of WTO rules to redress loopholes in WTO market access provisions, in particular 
those relating to the involvement of state trading enterprises in trade, tariff quotas and 
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domestic production subsidies, as part of the multilateral trade negotiations can play a useful 
role in facilitating future reforms in India. 
 
Relating to tariff cuts, the USA has long demanded that countries with higher tariffs 
on agricultural products should cut more. The EU demand has been for all countries to cut 
their tariff by an equal percentage.  Under the agricultural deal agreed upon in August 2003, 
the USA and EU now seek a mixture of these two approaches. The G-22 proposed in Cancun 
an ‘average’ formula for cutting tariff, which requires higher tariff cuts by developed 
countries.  Many trade economists are of the view that adopting the Swiss formula would be a 
desirable compromise of the EU-USA and G-22 positions on this issue.   
 
The developing country strategy so far of attempting to get developed countries to cut 
tariff without acceding to significant cuts by themselves has the potential to forgo most of the 
potential economic benefits of the Doha round. Any tariff cuts tilted in favour of preserving 
high tariffs in developed countries in the guise of providing ‘special and differential 
treatment’ is in reality an attempt to help perpetuate inefficient production in these countries.  
Moreover, an increasing share of agricultural exports (mostly processed food) from 
developing countries now goes to other developing countries.  This share is likely to increase 
rapidly in years to come, given rapid economic transformation in the East Asian Newly 
Industrialized countries (NIEs) and rapid catching-up growth in China.   
 
(b) Going Beyond the Border   
Developing countries are right to ask for dismantling of export and production related 
subsidies in developed countries. Continuing high agricultural subsidies in developed 
countries, in addition to their global economic welfare losses, undermine protagonists of 
reforms in developing countries.8  But, the fact that rich countries subsidize their agricultural 
exports is not a valid economic argument for developing countries to adopt similar 
distortionary policies. Adding another distortion to an existing distortion will not improve the 
situation, particularly in world markets where these countries individually do not have market 
power.  
                                                          
8 For example, since early 2001 India has been subsidizing exports of excess stocks of wheat and rice by the 
related STEs, in violation of the market access provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture.   This move was 




In its approach to restoring orderly conditions in world trade, the URAA has gone 
beyond the border measures that are traditionally the targets of the GATT discipline and 
focuses on distortionary effects of domestic support and export subsidy measures.  However, 
developing countries have been either largely exempted from these reform commitments or 
provided with ample loopholes for evading implementation of required reforms.  It is 
important that these exceptions are lifted and loopholes are closed so that developing 
countries participate as equal partners in the world trading system.   A firm multilateral 
commitment under the WTO would greatly help developing countries to undertake much 
needed, yet politically hard and socially painful, domestic agricultural reforms.  It is 
unrealistic to assume that reforms in the import trade regime will automatically trigger 
reforms in other areas.  On the contrary, countries always have the option of combining 
reduction of border protection under WTO commitments with greater reliance on non-frontier 
policies (such as production subsidies) in order to maintain the level of protection virtually 
unchanged unless there are binding multilateral commitments that constraint such behaviour.  
 
 (c) Domestic Adjustment Assistance for Broadening Reforms 
Agricultural reforms along the lines suggested above, notwithstanding their significant 
potential long run benefits, can cause politically and socially unpalatable socio-economic 
disturbances in the short run. A good many people might suffer, or may fear they might 
suffer, during the cause of the adjustment process.  In large countries like India and Brazil 
there is also the further problem that adjustment pains are likely to be unequally distributed 
among various regions and states. It is important to deal with these transitional problems as 
part of a rapid planned move toward redressing deep-rooted disarray in domestic agriculture.  
However, most developing countries do not have the resources (and perhaps also institutional 
capacity) to finance such programs.   
 
In this context, the provision of financial support for implementing social safety net 
programs and other initiatives to cushion vulnerable groups against the adjustment pressure 
can play an important role in making these reforms politically palatable and feasible.  While 
overloading the WTO with matters that fall beyond its purview may be counterproductive, 
there is certainly a case for a coordinated approach involving the WTO, international aid 
agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, and individual donor 
countries.   It is important to note that as part of the economic transition thorough global 
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integration in the post-war era, most developed countries have already put in place 
institutions and policies to handle the downside of openness to trade.  There is therefore a 
strong case for a well-coordinated international initiative to assist developing countries in 
putting in place similar institutions and policies, if we expect them to become equal partners 
in the process of removing the remaining impediments to global economic integration 
(Bhagwati 2004a, Chapter 15).   
 
At the Cancun summit, the IMF and the World Bank announced special trade 
assistance programs for making needed resources available (in addition to existing country 
lending levels) for developing countries to face challenging domestic economic adjustment to 
the impact of any Doha Round liberalisation undertaking.   These proposals are certainly 
steps in the right direction, but there will have to be some tangible progress in their 
implementation to entice a firm reform commitment from developing countries.  This is an 
area where individual donor countries also can play an important role in facilitating further 
trade reforms.  
 
(d) Institutional Support to improving capacity to meet SPS standards 
The SPS Agreement is of particular significant for agricultural-resource rich developing 
countries given the emergence of processed food as a dynamic export line.  Reformulating 
the agreement with a view to redressing the trade-impeding impact of the Agreement and to 
address obstacles faced by developing countries in the implementation of the agreement 
deserve close attention in future multilateral trade talks.  
  
Apart from these obstacles that constrain effective participation in the dispute 
settlement process, developing countries have expressed concerns about the manner in which 
the SPS Agreement currently operates. In particular, they are concerned that in setting 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards developed countries do not take adequate account of the 
circumstances of developing countries. It is also alleged that in many cases the time given 
between the notification of new SPS measures and their application is too short for 
developing countries to respond in an effective and appropriate manner.  
   
A key constraint in this respect is the low level of technical and scientific know-how 
in developing countries. Unlike conventional trade policy reforms, SPS regulations cannot be 
implemented simply through legislative declaration. There is a need for a global framework 
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to support national capacity building and improve the design of international standards.  
Quite apart from helping countries when they confront a dispute, there seems to be a great 
need for international initiative to educate developing country exporters and policy makers 
about the new legislation and on how to comply with internationally adopted food standards.  
This is certainly and area an area where there is ample room for fruitful ‘aid for trade’ 
initiatives by the international development community.  
 
(e) Achieving a Balance between SDTs  and  Multilateralism 
Developing countries have been increasingly defensive in trade negotiations under the Doha 
Round. They have begun to place increased emphasis on minimizing their commitment to 
reforms by asking for ‘special and differential treatment’ (SDTs) for commitments in all three 
areas on market access, export subsidy and domestic support.  This defensive mentality 
played a key role in the making of the Cancun stalemate.   
 
Given their relatively disadvantageous initial position in global integration, it is 
nothing but fair for developing countries to ask for relatively longer period for implementing 
reform commitments.  Moreover, as we have already argued, there is also a strong case for 
canvassing international support for adjustment assistance for implementing liberalisation 
reforms.  But the quest for wholesale extension of SDTs  to cover the key reform 
commitments is not a good idea for two reasons.  
 
First, reciprocity is the lifeblood of multilateral trade negotiations.  Except when it 
comes to outright development aid (which in any case are also driven by economic and geo-
political motives), no country is prepared to give for nothing in their dealings with other 
countries.  The domestic protectionist lobby in developed countries and the politicians who 
represent it insist that ‘there be a level paying field’ before they agree to abandon their 
insistence on trade protection and production subsidies (Bhagwati 2004b).  Second, the long-
term solution to developing country trade and development problems lies in the correction of 
distortions at their root source, rather than to covering-up issues though SDT.  For these 
reasons, trying to avoid confronting difficult reform commitments by hiding behind SDTs 
would prove to be a self-defeating strategy.   
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(f) FTAs:  An Alternative to Multilateral Liberalisation?   
Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of regional/bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs).  In particular, the USA has stepped up the drive to conclude free trade deals with an 
increasing number of developing countries.  The USA has already negotiated bilateral trade 
agreements with Mexico (in the form of NAFTA), Chile and Singapore, and begun bilateral 
talks with 14 other countries and promises many more.   Japan, China and countries in the 
ASEAN, and a number of countries in Latin America have also developed new enthusiasm in 
such arrangements.   
 
This newfound enthusiasm in FTAs is often justified by referring to the lackluster 
outcome to date of multilateral liberalisation efforts under the WTO.  However, FTAs are not 
an effective substitute for (or a stepping stone to) multilateral liberalisation, particularly when 
it come to agricultural trade, for two main reasons.  First, as the experience with the already-
negotiated trade agreements has clearly demonstrated, they tend to leave highly sensitive 
trade issues such as opening agricultural markets as ‘too hard’ (Garnaut and Vines 2004).  A 
good recent example is the US-Australia FTA which has left out the highly-competitive sugar 
industry in Australia, because of strong resistance by the US sugar lobby.  For the poor small 
countries in particular, the chances of getting from a bilateral deal with a large trading nation 
what they failed to get the Doha round are virtually nil.   Second, by their very nature, FTAs 
are not capable of providing a consistent framework of enforceable rules and disciplines on 
production subsidies.  Put simply, ‘production subsidies cannot be cut preferentially for 
favoured nations’ (Bhagwati, 2004b).   In sum, for agricultural liberalisation, multilateralism 




The Uruguay Round was successful in laying a solid foundation for redressing the long-
standing disarray in world agriculture.  However, the implementation of the agricultural 
reforms agreed upon in the Uruguay round so far has involved only very modest liberalisation 
in developed countries, and even less in developing countries. World agricultural trade still 
remained heavily distorted by significant border controls, export subsidies and various 
domestic production supports.   
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Speedy reduction of bound and applied tariffs,  widening the coverage of WTO rules 
to redress loopholes in WTO market access provisions, in particular STE involvement in 
foreign trade and widespread use of tariff quotas should receive high priority in the future 
reform agenda.   It is not in the long-term interest of developing countries to clamor for SDTs 
other than asking for a longer implementation period when it comes to market opening, 
export subsidy and domestic support commitments.  They should instead canvas strongly for 
SDTs in the form of domestic adjustment support for dealing liberalisation reforms.  A 
unified approach that focuses simultaneously on all significant trade and production 
distortions is the only effective way to ending disarray in domestic agriculture in developing 
countries.  Developing countries are right to ask for greater access to developed country 
market and to cut trade distorting subsidies in these countries.  But these demands should be a 
part of unified approach which blend reciprocity and long-term commitment to domestic 
market forms.     
 
A firm commitment by developed countries to continue with promised reforms is also 
very important for creating an enabling environment for reforms in developing democracies 
where there is a strong anti-globalisation lobby.   However, the major constraining factor on 
furthering reform is the adjustment pain involved in the dismantling of long-standing 
production subsidies and consumer price support schemes. Provision of international 
financial support for implementing required social safety net measures can play an important 
role in making such comprehensive reforms politically palatable and feasible.  While 
overloading the WTO with matters that fall beyond its purview may be counterproductive, 
there is certainly a case for a coordinated approach involving the WTO and international 
developing finance institutions, including regional development banks in this sphere to 
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Table 1: The Role of Agriculture in Developing Countries by Region and Income  Group 
 Share of agriculture in GDP (%) Rural population (% of GDP) 
Region 1980 1990 2001 1980 1990 2001 
East Asia and Pacific 27.7 23.8 14.6 78.8 71.6 62.7 
Europe and central Asia --- 16.9 10.1 41.5 36.9 37.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 10.3 8.7 7.8 35.0 28.9 24.2 
Middle East and North Africa 10.3 14.6 --- 51.9 46.6 42.3 
South Asia 38.2 30.5 24.9 77.7 75.0 72.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 17.6 18.0 16.1 79.0 74.2 67.7 
       
Income Group       
Low income 33.7 29.1 23.8 76.4 73.0 69.2 
Middle income 15.9 13.9 9.8 62.0 55.1 48.4 
Lower middle income 23.6 19.9 12.5 68.3 61.4 54.4 
Upper middle income 9.5 8.3 7.1 33.8 27.5 22.8 
Low and middle income 18.8 16.5 12.2 68.4 63.4 58.5 
High income 4.0 2.8 1.9* 26.9 24.7 22.5 
Note :  
* Data for 2000   --- Data not available 




Table 2:  World Merchandise Exports by Country Groups, 1980/81, 1990/01,1999/01# 















Developed countries        
1980/81 16.6 1.8 7.7 7.2 12.4 70.9 100 
1990/91 12.9 1.2 5.0 6.7 8.8 78.3 100 
2000/01 10.0 0.8 3.4 5.8 9.4 80.6 100 
Developing countries        
1980/81 17.0 2.1 8.3 6.5 62.1 21.1 100 
1990/91 16.6 1.9 6.9 7.9 28.9 54.4 100 
2000/01 10.6 1.1 3.9 5.5 22.1 67.3 100 
Low-income         
1980/81 15.1 1.0 10.1 3.8 94.7 10.3 100 
1990/91 20.1 1.3 12.7 6.4 55.8 35.1 100 
2000/01 13.8 0.7 8.1 5.6 57.5 43.4 100 
Middle-income        
1980/81 21.2 2.7 11.3 7.0 78.4 9.5 100 
1990/91 23.3 1.8 10.0 11.7 32.5 45.0 100 
2000/01 15.1 1.1 5.9 8.4 19.8 63.6 100 
High-income        
1980/81 15.8 2.3 6.2 7.5 41.1 30.9 100 
1990/91 13.5 2.0 4.5 6.8 22.1 61.8 100 




Table 2 (Continued) 















Developed countries        
1980/81 68.4 64.6 67.3 73.8 30.7 88.2 68.9 
1990/91 72.0 68.1 70.6 73.9 50.2 82.7 76.9 
2000/01 68.3 61.0 66.7 70.3 49.4 73.2 69.6 
Developing countries        
1980/81 31.6 35.4 32.7 26.2 69.3 11.8 31.1 
1990/91 28.0 31.9 29.4 26.1 49.8 17.3 23.1 
2000/01 31.7 39.0 33.3 29.7 50.6 26.8 30.4 
    Low-income         
1980/81 6.1 3.6 8.6 3.7 23.0 1.3 6.8 
1990/91 4.5 2.9 7.2 2.8 12.6 1.5 3.0 
2000/01 4.4 2.7 7.4 3.2 14.0 1.8 3.2 
    Middle-income        
1980/81 9.9 11.4 11.2 7.9 21.9 1.3 7.8 
1990/91 9.0 6.9 9.8 9.0 12.9 3.3 5.3 
2000/01 10.3 8.3 11.4 10.3 10.4 5.8 6.9 
    High-income        
1980/81 15.6 20.3 12.9 14.7 24.4 9.2 16.5 
1990/91 14.5 22.0 12.4 14.4 24.3 12.5 14.8 
2000/01 17.0 28.0 14.5 16.2 26.2 19.2 20.3 
(C )   Export growth 
(%)#
       
Developed countries        
1980-90 2.1 1.5 1.1 3.0 1.6 3.8 3.3 
1990-01 0.8 0.0 0.3 1.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 
1980-01 1.4 0.7 0.7 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.7 
Developing countries        
1980-90 1.2 0.7 0.4 2.2 -2.3 6.1 1.3 
1990-01 1.7 1.5 1.1 2.2 2.6 5.0 3.9 
1980-01 1.5 1.1 0.8 2.2 0.1 5.5 2.6 
     Low-income         
1980-90 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.5 -3.6 4.9 -1.1 
1990-01 1.0 0.1 0.7 2.2 3.0 3.9 2.9 
1980-01 0.7 0.2 0.3 1.8 -0.3 4.4 0.9 
    Middle-income        
1980-90 1.4 -1.2 0.3 3.4 -3.3 8.8 0.9 
1990-01 1.7 1.4 1.3 2.3 1.4 5.6 3.9 
1980-01 1.6 0.1 0.8 2.8 -0.9 7.2 2.4 
    High-income        
1980/81 1.5 1.6 0.7 1.8 -0.8 5.7 2.2 
1990/01 1.9 1.7 1.3 2.2 2.9 5.0 4.2 
1999/01 1.7 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.0 5.3 3.2 
Note:     
* Figures reported in Panels A and B are calculated from two-year average export values.  
#  Annual compound growth rate estimated by fitting a logarithmic trend line to US$ export value series 
Source:  Compiled from UN Comtrade Database. 
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Table 3:  Share of Processed Food in Total Agro-food Exports (%) 
 1980/81 1990/91 2000/01 
Developed countries 48.1 57.5 62.7 
Developing countries 44.0 53.4 58.7 
   Low-income 27.2 33.5 40.6 
   Middle-income  38.3 54.0 59.0 
   High-income 54.8 59.9 64.1 
   World 46.8 56.4 61.5 
Source:  Compiled from UN Comtrade database. 
 
 
Table 4:  Direction of Developed  and Developing Country Trade (%) 
 To developing  To developed   
 1980-81 1990-91 2000-01 1980-81 1990-91 2000-01 
From developed countries       
    Agricultural products 24.8 23.4 22.7 75.2 76.6 77.3
    manufactured products 26.9 26.7 27.7 73.1 73.3 72.3
From developing countries       
    Agricultural products 26.9 27.6 36.9 73.1 72.4 63.1
    Manufactured products 34.2 33.0 37.0 65.8 67.0 63.0




Table 5:  Applied Tariff,   NTB Coverage and Bound Tariff by County Groups (%),  
    Circa 1998 
 Developed 
countries   
Developing  countries (DCs) 







(a)  Applied Tariff       
Agricultural products 6.4 17.0 26.6 19.6 17.3 16.0
     Food 6.2 25.0 27.2 20.3 17.9 17.1
     Agri. raw material 1.8 14.3 16.1 10.5 10 4.3
Manufactures  3.5 12.4 20.9 13.6 13.5 5.0
(b )  Bound Tariff       
Agricultural products 7.2 59.0 86.0 48.0#  29.0
Manufactures 3.8 42.0 64.0 34.0#  17.0
(c)  NTB Coverage*       
Agricultural products 27.8 11.8 5.2 12.3 21.7 16.9
    Food 6.2 25.0 27.2 20.3 17.9 17.1
    Agri. Raw material 14.9 8.4 2.6 8.9 20.1 14
Note:   *  NTB, non-tariff barriers defined to include licensing, prohibitions, quotas (including tariff quotas), 
state trading monopolies and administrative pricing.  NTB coverage is calculated as a frequency ratio of all HS 
two-digit product categories under NTB.  
 #  Average for middle and upper middle income countries. 
Source:  Compiled from Finger (2001), Tables 4.2 and 4.2;  Hoeckman, Mattoo and English (2002), Tables 
11.1 and A-2; and Ingco and Nash (2004), Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5 
 
